You’re conflating three different things: (1) founders’ personal moral failures, (2) the legitimacy theory they articulated, and (3) what an emergency posture from SCOTUS actually proves.

On (1) vs (2): yes, the founding generation tolerated massive injustice. That doesn’t refute the point I was making. The Enlightenment idea they leaned on is that rights pre-exist government and government power is delegated and limited. The later amendments you list aren’t a rebuttal to that framework, they’re the country painfully applying it more consistently over time via the mechanisms the Constitution itself provides.

On the Court point: “SCOTUS didn’t temporarily pause X” does not equal “no constitutional violation.” Emergency stays/injunctions turn on things like posture, standing, likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, and deference; not a full merits finding that the challenged conduct is constitutional. “Shadow docket lets it continue” is not the same as “the Court blessed it.”

And the biggest issue is your last paragraph: legitimate does not equal constitutional.

Congress failing to act, the President authorizing something, and courts not immediately stopping it may show the government has the power to do it right now; it does not show the action is within constitutional limits. If that were the test, then any coordinated abuse across branches would become “legitimate by definition,” which is exactly what checks and balances are meant to prevent.

If you want to argue “these protections aren’t being violated,” then argue the specifics: what’s the standard being used for stops, entries, detentions, and removals, and how is it being applied? “It’s enforcement” is not a constitutional analysis.

You’re just trying to robe your personal idea of what’s constitutional in some fairytale amalgamation of modern social justice and enlightenment writings.

The reality is simple: the founding fathers did not and would not care that illegal (or heck, even legal) African immigrants were being arrested and deported, as evidenced by the fact that many of them literally held slaves. So, your opening position that I “should read more of the thoughts of America’s founding fathers” is wrong.

To checks and balances, the current state of government action is ironically in line with how those founding fathers would want government run.

Hamilton: “The courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature… to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority”. If the courts don’t see fit to constrain this exercise of power, it’s within the authority.

Washington himself led a militia against the Whiskey Rebellion, since the members were using intimidation, violence, and obstruction to impede a government function (wow, sounds familiar…)

Turning back to the present day, the standard being used is simple: The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes immigration officers to “interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States.” 66 Stat. 233, 8 U. S. C. §1357(a)(1). Immigration officers “may briefly detain” an individual “for questioning” if they have “a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned . . . is an alien illegally in the United States.” 8 CFR §287.8(b)(2) (2025); see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 884 (1975); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266, 273 (2002). The reasonable suspicion inquiry turns on the “totality of the particular circumstances.” Brignoni- Ponce, 422 U. S., at 885, n. 10; Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273.

If you want to argue these protections are being violated, you should probably make a stronger case than the one before the court that’s likely to lose. I’ll defer to the Supreme Court for constitutional analysis, as the founding fathers intended.

You’re still dodging the point by arguing founders’ personal depravity instead of the political theory they articulated: rights don’t come from government, authority is delegated, and it has limits. The fact that many founders violated their own principles doesn’t erase the principles, it proves why limiting doctrines and later amendments were necessary.

And the “they wouldn’t care” claim is overstated even on its own terms. The founders were divided and inconsistent, but several explicitly condemned slavery and/or refused to participate in it:

Jefferson (who was deeply compromised personally) still wrote this about slavery’s corruption and consequences:

> “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever…” (Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XVIII (1784), as transcribed by Encyclopedia Virginia)

Jefferson also documented that Congress removed an anti–slave trade passage from his draft for political reasons (i.e., to get unanimity):

> “The clause too, reprobating the enslaving the inhabitants of Africa, was struck out in complaisance to South Carolina and Georgia, who had never attempted to restrain the importation of slaves…” (Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography (1821), as reproduced by Monticello / Avalon Project)

John Adams:

> “my opinion against it has always been known… and never in my Life did I own a Slave.” (John Adams to George Churchman and Jacob Lindley, Jan. 24, 1801; Gilder Lehrman Institute primary source)

So no, it’s not accurate to collapse “the founders” into “they endorsed whatever abuses you can point to.” Some did; some didn’t; many were hypocrites; but the rights-and-limits framework is real, and it’s the framework the country later used to correct (some of) those failures.

On Hamilton: yes, courts are an intermediate body. But it does not follow that “if the Court doesn’t stop it (especially on an emergency posture), it’s therefore within authority.” Courts can be wrong, courts can be procedural, and emergency orders are not merits adjudications. “Not enjoined today” is not the same thing as “constitutional.” If that were the rule, coordinated abuse across branches would become self-legitimating (exactly what checks and balances are meant to prevent).

Washington and the Whiskey Rebellion is a non sequitur. Nobody is arguing the government can’t enforce laws or respond to violence. The question is whether current enforcement is staying inside constitutional rails.

And on your legal citations: sure, INA authority exists. But statutory authority doesn’t dissolve the Fourth Amendment. Your own lead case, Brignoni‑Ponce, is precisely about limits: reasonable suspicion has to be based on specific articulable facts, and it can’t collapse into ethnicity/race-by-proxy plus “totality of circumstances” handwaving.

So let’s keep it concrete: what specific factors are officers using in practice to form reasonable suspicion, and what safeguards prevent that from becoming a dragnet? “The INA authorizes questioning” is not an answer to whether particular stops/detentions are constitutional.

Finally: “I defer to the Supreme Court” is fine as a personal posture, but it’s not an argument that the Constitution has no redlines unless five Justices say so on a given day (especially not on the shadow docket).

> “to consider the judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional questions: a very dangerous doctrine indeed and one which would place us under the despotism of an Oligarchy.” (Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820)