Just to be clear, because I don't think you're making this mistake, but it seems like people replying to you are, this research data is referring to all blackouts nationwide over some study period, not the Texas ten-year storm from a few months ago.
When that storm hit, ability to pay meant absolutely nothing. Poor and rich alike all lost power. When the generating stations and lines all freeze, it becomes impossible to get energy out, whether anyone can pay or not. Money doesn't magically make capacity appear when the delivery network itself fails. That was really the downfall of the Texas approach. Naive economics assumes you can deal with shortages by just rationing using price, and higher prices will incentivize producers to produce more. But if the delivery infrastructure stops working, it makes no difference what the producers' incentives are. They can't deliver anything whether they want to or not, no matter what you're willing to pay them.
When that storm hit, ability to pay meant absolutely nothing. Poor and rich alike all lost power. When the generating stations and lines all freeze, it becomes impossible to get energy out, whether anyone can pay or not. Money doesn't magically make capacity appear when the delivery network itself fails. That was really the downfall of the Texas approach. Naive economics assumes you can deal with shortages by just rationing using price, and higher prices will incentivize producers to produce more. But if the delivery infrastructure stops working, it makes no difference what the producers' incentives are. They can't deliver anything whether they want to or not, no matter what you're willing to pay them.